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Alien Land Laws: Constitutional
Limitations on State Power to Regulate
By James Alan Huizinga*

Foreign direct investment 1 in real property traditionally has
received special public and legislative attention. Legislative restrictions on alien2 ownership of real property were enacted extensively
during two early periods of United States history.' The first wave
of alien land laws began in the 1880's and continued until the turn
of the century. During that period, legislation restricting alien
ownership of real property was enacted by eleven states.4 The restrictions were supported actively by both the Populist and Republican parties as necessary to alleviate depressed agricultural
conditions and to guard against the danger of absentee ownership
of farm lands.5 As the agricultural economy improved, however,
and the Populist movement faded, the first wave of alien land ownership restrictions subsided. Nevertheless, some states did not repeal or modify the statutory restrictions that had been imposed
* A.B., 1978, Occidental College. Member, Third Year Class.
1. Direct investment is characterized by the substantial degree of control exercised by
an investor over the property or interest in which his or her investment is made. See International Investment Survey Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. § 3201(10) (1976).
2. For the purpose of this Note, an alien is defined as any person who is not a citizen
or national of the United States. A nonresident alien is an alien who has not been admitted
lawfully to the United States for permanent residence under the applicable immigration and
nationalization laws.
3. These laws are commonly referred to as alien land laws. That name is misleading as
the statutes restrict ownership of domestic lands not alien lands. For ease of reference, however, this Note will continue to use the traditional term. A detailed discussion of the historical evolution of alien land laws may be found in Sullivan, Alien Land Laws: A Re-Evaluation, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 15 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Sullivan]. See also Anderson, A Survey of
Alien Land Investment in U.S., Colonial Times to Present, 8 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN DmEcT INVEsTMRNT IN U.S. L-2 [hereinafter cited as Anderson]; Morrison, Limitations on Alien Investment in American Real Estate, 60 MINN. L.
Rav. 621 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Morrison]. Anderson, supra, classified the history of
alien land legislation into three periods. For a different historical classification, see Morrison, supra, at 623-29, and Sullivan, supra, at 26-34.
4. Sullivan, supra note 3,'at 30-31 & n.68.
5. Anderson, supra note 3, at L-14.
[251]
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upon alien land ownership by these laws.6
Growing anti-Japanese sentiment in the 1920's prompted the
second wave of alien land laws.7 During that period, Japanese immigrants had established large farm communities in California,
Oregon, and Washington. 8 These new residents were greeted with racial prejudice and accusations of unfair competition. In response to
the public outcry advocating that restrictions be placed on Japanese ownership of land,9 several states passed legislation prohibiting the ownership of land by any person ineligible for citizenship.10
The practical effect of these laws, because Asians were the only
class of persons statutorily precluded from eligibility for United
States citizenship, was that only Asians were excluded from owning real property. 1 Surprisingly, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of these statutes, concluding that they
did not deprive resident Japanese aliens of either due process or
equal protection.'2
The promulgation of racially discriminatory statutes waned in
the 1930's, 13 but with the outbreak of World War H, anti-Japanese
sentiment was revived, and states once again deemed it necessary
to enact legislation limiting alien land tenure.1 ' Following the war,
however, a notable trend to eliminate discriminatory land laws developed,' 5 influenced, at least in part, by two Supreme Court decisions indicating that alien land laws directed at the Japanese were
vulnerable to attack on equal protection grounds.' 6 Taking notice
of the Court's forewarning and recognizing the racial motivation
behind these state laws, several state supreme courts held that
such discriminatory restrictions were unconstitutional. 7 Still other
6.

Morrison, supra note 3,'at 626.

7. See generally McGovney, The Anti-Japanese Land Laws of California and Ten
Other States, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 7 (1947).

8. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 32-33.
9. Morrison, supra note 3, at 626.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 626-27 & n.30.
12. See, e.g., Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313
(1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
13. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 34.
14. Id.

15. Morrison, supra note 3, at 627-28.
16.

See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Conm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Oyama v. California,

332 U.S. 633 (1948).
17. See, e.g., Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952); State v. Oakland, 129
Mont. 347, 287 P.2d 39 (1955); Namba v. McCourt, 185 Or. 579, 204 P.2d 569 (1949).
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states repealed their alien land laws."" As in the period following
the first wave, however, a few of the statutes were never challenged
or repealed. 9
The 1970's appear to have signalled yet a third wave of statutory restrictions on alien ownership of real property in the United
States.20 A xenophobic attitude toward foreign investment, 21 cou-

pled with media reports of extraordinary sales of real property to
foreign interests22 and claims of adverse effects on the farming
community,23 have generated a largely emotional reaction 24 by
18. Morrison, supra note 3, at 627-28.
19. Id.
20. The increased public interest in land investments by foreigners appears to be only
part of a larger public concern with foreign direct investment in all United States investment markets. Foreign direct investment in the United States increased from
$30,800,000,000 at the end of 1976 to $40,800,000,000 at the close of 1978. The annual rate
of growth of foreign investment increased approximately 12% in 1977 and 18% in 1978. In
contrast, United States direct investment abroad increased 10% in 1977 and 12% in 1978.
ForeignInvestment in U.S. Industry, The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Major Issues System, Issue Brief No. IB78091, at 4 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Foreign
Investment in U.S. Industry].
Congress recognized the need for reliable data on the effects of foreign direct investment in the United States as a prerequisite to the formulation of responsible legislation, and
enacted the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1976)), directing the Secretary of Commerce to conduct a comprehensive study of the effects of foreign direct investment in United States industry. The
study resulted in a nine-volume report presented to Congress in April of 1976. See U.S.
DpT. OF COMMERCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN DIRECT INvEs mFrr IN U.S. (1976).
The report concluded that foreign investors do not control a large share of any major sector
of the national economy and that foreign investment is favorable to the national economy.
Id. at CRS-3. Although no restrictions on foreign investment were imposed by Congress at
that time, an additional study was commissioned in the Investment Survey Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-472, 90 Stat. 2059 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1976)). This Act
directs the President to collect data and conduct periodic surveys on investments made
abroad by United States investors as well as on foreign investment in the United States.
U.S. Dr. oF CoMMERCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN INVEST IN U.S. at CRS-2 (1976).
21. The attitude of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, Mr. Jan Eric Cartwright, demonstrates the reactionary fears of many Americans. That government official has recently
warned the public that "Idi Amin could be your next-door neighbor. What's to keep them
from taking over political influence, expanding city limits and taking over rural lands?
What's to prevent foreign ownership of our banks, oil interests and communications?" National Sentiment Against Land Holdings of Foreigners Strikes Chord in Oklahoma, Wall
Street Journal, July 7, 1980, pt. 2, at 1.
22. See, e.g., Irving, Mysterious Big Spenders: Aliens Buying our Farms, San Francisco Examiner, September 8, 1978, at C-1; Yoshihara, Real Estate A Big Draw for Foreigners, Los Angeles Times, May 31, 1978, pt. I, at 1; The Selling of America, Tnm, May 29,
1978, at 71.
,23. See note 70 & accompanying text infra.
24. See Luttrell, The "Danger"From Foreign Ownership of U.S. Farmland,61 FED.
RES. BANK OF ST. Louis REv. 3-4 (1979).
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many against land acquisition by aliens. State legislatures have responded by enacting, or attempting to enact, new restrictions on
alien land tenure.2 5
This third wave of alien land laws adds to the number of existing state statutes that affect alien ownership of real property.2 8
While some states place little or no restrictions on acquisition of
real property by aliens,2 7 other states substantially restrict alien
25. In 1978 the California Legislature failed to pass a proposed bill which would have
imposed restrictions upon nonresident alien ownership of real property. California A.B. 3627
(1978). The California Legislature is currently considering an identical bill, California A.B.
262 (1979), and an accompanying state constitutional amendment, California A.C.A. 20
(1979). The Illinois Legislature similarly defeated a bill in 1977 which would have eliminated a nonresident alien's right to acquire agricultural land. Illinois H.B. 1394 (1977). The
1979 Oregon Legislature considered three alternative nonresident alien land laws: (1) an
absolute prohibition on all alien ownership of real property, Oregon H.B. 415 (1979); (2) an
acreage limitation of 40 acres, Oregon S.B. 473 (1979); and (3) imposition of reporting and
registration requirements on alien land holders, Oregon H.B. 2513 (1979). However, legislative response to foreign investment in real property has not been uniform. In 1978, Arizona
repealed statutes restricting the property rights of aliens not eligible for citizenship. AIz.
REV. STAT. §§ 33-1201 to -1210, repealed by 1978 Ariz. Seass. Laws, ch. 129 § 1.
26. Some existing provisions indirectly affect alien property rights. For example, state
probate code provisions may restrict an alien's right to acquired real property by inheritance. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-511 to -512 (1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 64-1 to -5
(1975). Also, statutes restricting all corporate ownership of land may in turn limit the ability
of alien-controlled corporations to acquire real property. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 175901 (1974); Ky. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 271A. 705(1) (Baldwin 1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
500.24(3) (West Supp. 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 951 (West Supp. 1979); Tax. Rav.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-4.01 to .06 (Vernon 1980). This Note, however, concerns only state
legislation directly restricting alien acquisition and ownership of real property.
27. Thirty-four states place little or no restriction on alien ownership of real property.
In over half the states which impose little or no restriction on property, alien property rights
have been specifically affirmed by constitutional provision, statute, or judicial decision. See
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 34; ALA. CODE § 35-1-1 (1975); ARK. CONST. art. II, § 20; ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 50-301 (1947); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 20; CAL. CIV. CODE § 671 (West 1954); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 25, §§ 307-308 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 79-303 (1973); IDAHO CODE § 55-103 (1979);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 451 (1964); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 101 (1974); MASs.
ANN. LAws ch. 184, § 1 (Law. Co-op. 1977); MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 6; MCH. STAT. ANN. §
26.1105 (1970); NEV. Rav. STAT. § 111.055 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3-18 (West 19,40);
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 10-11 (McKinney 1968); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-2-1 (1956); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 64-201 (1976); Tix. Rzv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 166a (Vernon 1969); State v.
Boston, Concord & Montreal R.R. Co., 25 Vt. 433 (1853); VA. CODE § 55-1 (1950); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 64.16.005 (West Supp. 1980); W. VA. CODE § 36-1-21 (1966). Generally,
these states allow both resident and nonresident aliens to take and hold real property as
fully as a citizen of the United States. In addition, aliens normally will be accorded the same
rights of disposal and transmission as United States citizens. It is also not uncommon for
these states to forbid questioning or impeaching title on the basis of the alienage of any
person through whom title was derived. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 15 (McKinney
1968).
Three of these states do require that aliens be subjects of a foreign government at peace
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ownership rights. Although the forms of these statutory restrictions vary greatly, they may be characterized generally as those
limiting the amount of land that may be held;28 those limiting the
length of time that land may be held;29 and those prohibiting acquisition or ownership without regard to the amount of land, the
duration held, or the type of land.30
with the United States to be entitled to such rights. See GA. CODE ANN. § 79-303 (1973);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3-18 (West 1940); VA. CODE § 55-1 (1950). State restrictions on alien
land tenure based on the alien's government being at peace with the United States are most
likely unenforceable, because disposition of enemy property located in the United States is
controlled by federal statute. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 31-44 (1976). Accordingly, the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution dictates that the federal statute will control.
28. Three states, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Wisconsin, limit the amount of
land that may be held by aliens. Pennsylvania prohibits aliens from holding property comprising more than 5,000 acres or from which the net annual income exceeds $20,000. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 32 (Purdon 1965). South Carolina imposes a seemingly meaningless
restriction by not allowing aliens or alien corporations to own or control more than 500,000
acres. S.C. CODE § 27-13-30 (1976). Recently enacted legislation in Wisconsin makes it unlawful for any nonresident alien or any corporation in which 20% of the stock is owned by
nonresident aliens to hold more than 640 acres unless acquired by devise, inheritance, or in
good faith in the collection of debts by process of law. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 710.02 (West Supp.
1979).
29. The period for which an alien may hold property is restricted in Illinois, Indiana,
and Kentucky. Illinois prohibits an alien from holding real property for longer than six
years or, in the case of a minor, six years after he or she reaches the age of 21. ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 6, §§ 1-2 (Smith-Hurd 1975). Indiana combines two types of restrictions by directing that alien land holdings in excess of 320 acres will escheat to the state five years
from the date of acquisition. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-1-8-2 (Burns 1973). Kentucky allows
aliens to hold real property for eight years, except that resident aliens are permitted to hold
lands for 21 years if used for residential or business purposes. Ky. Rav. STAT. ANN. §
381.300-.340 (Baldwin 1969).
30. Five states, Connecticut, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Wyoming, restrict
alien ownership and acquisition of real property without regard to the amount of land, the
duration held, or the type of land. Connecticut grants full property rights to resident aliens
and to citizens of France upon a showing of French reciprocity. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§
47-57 (West 1978). Other nonresident aliens are allowed to hold only mining property. Id. §§
47-58.
In Mississippi, resident aliens are free to acquire and hold land, while nonresident
aliens who have not declared their intention to become United States citizens are not. Miss.
CODE ANN. § 89-1-23 (1972). Persons prohibited from acquiring Mississippi lands are allowed 20 years to dispose of real property acquired in the enforcement of a debt. Id. Interestingly, citizens from Syria and Lebanon are allowed to inherit property from Mississippi
citizens. Id.
Nebraska prohibits all aliens and corporations not formed under local state law from
acquiring or leasing any real property for longer than five years. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-402
(1976). The restrictions do not apply to real property necessary for erecting or maintaining
manufacturing or industrial facilities, nor to real property lying within three miles of corporate limits of a city or village. Id. § 76-413 to -414. Nonresident aliens who acquire land in
enforcement of a lien are given 10 years to divest, id. § 76-411, and resident aliens must
dispose of lands acquired by devise or descent within five years. Id. § 76-405.
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The most recently enacted statutes restricting alien ownership
concern primarily agricultural lands. Five states have enacted leg-

islation designed to'curb foreign investment by prohibiting future
acquisitions of such lands by nonresident aliens. These states are,

not surprisingly, Iowa, 1 Minnesota,32 Missouri,33 North Dakota,3 '
Oklahoma prohibits ownership of real property by all aliens not residents of the state.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 121-122 (West 1971). Aliens who are not entitled to own real
property and who acquire such property by devise, descent, or foreclosure of a lien are allowed five years to divest. Id. § 123.
Wyoming uses the reciprocity standard commonly found in probate code provisions to
determine all alien rights to acquire and hold real property. Absent a showing of reciprocity,
nonresident aliens who are not eligible for citizenship may not acquire or hold land. Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 34-15-101 to -103 (1977).
31. Recent legislation in Iowa, effective January 1, 1980, grants full property rights to
nonresident aliens, foreign businesses, and foreign governments, subject to severe restrictions on the purchase or the acquisition of agricultural lands. IOWA CODE ANN. § 567.1-.3
(West Supp. 1980). Agricultural land acquired by such persons by devise or descent must be
disposed of within two years. Id. § 567.5. A special exception, however, is granted for parcels
of land under 320 acres which are acquired for an immediate or pending use other than
farming if so converted within five years. Id. § 567.3-.4. Nonresident aliens who owned agricultural lands prior to the effective date of the new legislation are allowed to hold those
lands but must register the land with the secretary of state. Id. § 567.7. Failure to comply
with registration and reporting requirements may be punished by fines of up to $2,000. Id. §
567.11. Lands that are acquired in violation of the act are sold at foreclosure sales, and those
proceeds which do not exceed the amount paid by the alien are returned to the alien. Id. §
567.10.
32. In 1977, Minnesota enacted legislation similar to that of Iowa prohibiting nonresident aliens or business organizations in which 20% or more of the control or ownership is
vested in nonresident aliens from acquiring any interest in agricultural land. MiNN. STAT.
ANN. § 500.221(2) (West Supp. 1980). The prohibited purchaser is allowed one year from the
date of court judgment finding a violation of the act to dispose of the land before the land
escheats to the state. Id. § 500.221(3). Reports on agricultural lands held before the effective
date of the legislation must be filed annually with the Commissioner of Agriculture, id. §
500.221(4), and penalties are imposed for willful failure to comply with these reporting requirements. Id. § 500.221(5).
33. In 1978, legislation in Missouri made it illegal for nonresident aliens or foreign
businesses in which a controlling interest is owned by aliens from acquiring or leasing for
longer than 10 years more than five acres of agricultural land. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442.560-.581
(Vernon Supp. 1980). Such persons, however, are accorded complete rights to acquire all
other types of real property. Id. § 442.560. Exceptions also are provided for acquisition of
agricultural land necessary for nonagricultural business operation or for lease in family farm
units. Id. § 442.591. Notice of the pendency of action by the attorney general and a court
order finding violation of the act must be filed at the recorder of deeds; the owner then is
given two years from the date of judgment to dispose of the property. Id. § 442.567.
34. North Dakota follows the general pattern of granting all aliens and foreign businesses complete property rights subject to the prohibition on acquiring, whether directly or
indirectly, any interest in agricultural land. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-01-11, 47-10.1-.02 (Supp.
1979). However, Canadians expressly are excluded from restrictions on nonresident aliens
and foreign businesses. Id. § 47-10.1-.02. The nonresident alien is allowed three years to
dispose of agricultural land acquired by devise, descent, or enforcement of a lien. Aliens
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and South Dakota."5
Legislative concern about foreign investment in American real
estate has not been limited to the states. Congress recently enacted
the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978.6 This
legislation provides for the gathering of information about foreign
investment in agricultural land to determine its effects on United
States agricultural interests, particularly those of the family
farmer.3 7 In addition, legislation recently introduced in Congress
would prohibit nonresident alien investors 8 from acquiring any interest in United States agricultural land except after application
by a particular alien and where the Secretary of Agriculture makes
specified determinations regarding the desirability of such
investment.3 9
prohibited from owning property are allowed one year after the notice of judgment is filed
with the recorder's office to dispose of property acquired in violation of the act. Id. § 4710.1-.02, -.04. The act also imposes extensive annual reporting requirements on nonresident
aliens who acquired their property prior to enactment of the statute, id. § 47-10.1-.05, and
makes it a misdemeanor to knowingly record any instrument in violation of the act. Id. § 4710.1-.03, -.06.
35. South Dakota, pursuant to legislation enacted in 1979, does not allow nonresident
aliens or foreign governments to acquire any interest in agricultural land in excess of 160
acres. S.D. ConInEn LAws ANN. § 43-2A-2 (Supp. 1979). Agricultural land acquired by devise, descent, or enforcement of a lien must be disposed of within three years or it will
escheat to the state. Id. § 43-2A-3, -4, -6.
36. 7 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3508 (Supp. II 1978).
37. Under the provisions of the Act, foreign persons, corporations, partnerships, and
other legal entities acquiring or transferring any interest, other than a security interest, in
agricultural land must file a report with the Secretary of Agriculture within 90 days. Id. §
3501(a). The report must specify the legal name and citizenship of the purchaser, the type
of interest acquired, and the purchase price. Id. Reporting requirements also are imposed on
foreign interests holding agricultural land on the effective date of the Act. Id. § 3501(b). Any
foreign person who fails to comply with reporting requirements, or knowingly submits a
false report, may be held liable for civil penalties of up to 25% of the fair market value of
their interest in the land. Id. § 3502. The Act also directs the Secretary of Agriculture to
analyze data obtained, particularly with respect to family farms and rural communities, and
to report such findings to the President and the Congress. Id. § 3504. See also H.R. REP.
No. 1570, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2914.

38. The prohibitions would apply to investments by individuals, corporations, partnerships, and other legal entities. S. 194, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
39. The Secretary of Agriculture must determine that: (1) the foreign investor holds or
controls no other interest in United States agricultural land; (2) the interest to be acquired
is no larger than a family farm unit of land; (3) the aggregate of all interests of foreign
investors in the agricultural land to be purchased does not exceed 50% of the ownership
interest in the land; and (4) the acquisition will not be incompatible with the national interests. Id. The proposed legislation also provides that if the Secretary determines that foreign
acquisition is beneficial to the national interest, such acquisition may be approved without
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These recently enacted alien land laws, as well as those already in force, most likely will be tested in the courts during the
next several years. This Note examines the constitutional issues relating to legislative power, both state and federal, to regulate alien
land tenure.4 0 The Note first will address the preliminary issue of
whether the traditional state power over land within its borders
limits the power of the federal government to regulate alien ownership of land. The Note next considers whether the states have the
power to regulate land ownership rights of alien investors. First,
because foreign investment affects foreign commerce, the constitutionality of the state power to regulate is examined under the negative implications of the commerce clause. This analysis will focus
upon what constitutes foreign commerce, the tests developed by
the United States Supreme Court in determining the validity of
state regulation affecting interstate and foreign commerce, and the
application of these concepts to restrictive alien land laws. The
possibility that state laws burdening foreign commerce are subject
to more exacting judicial scrutiny than those burdening interstate
commerce is also examined. Second, because alien land laws affect
international relations, state regulation will be analyzed to determine if it imposes an unconstitutional burden on the foreign affairs
power of the federal government. Finally, the Note concludes that
the negative implications of the commerce clause and the foreign
affairs power, in conjunction, are sufficient to render state alien
land laws unconstitutional.
the above findings. Id.
40. Several constitutional issues raised by state and federal statutes restricting alien
rights to acquire and hold domestic real property are beyond the scope of this Note. These
include whether such legislation violates equal protection or due process rights guaranteed
by the Constitution. At the present time the scope of these constitutional protections is not
clear with respect to restriction on alien acquisition of real property. See, e.g., Estate of
Horman, 5 Cal. 3d 62, 485 P.2d 785, 95 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1971). The questions raised are
timely, however, as legislation directed solely at nonresident alienshas been enacted recently. For a comprehensive examination of the equal protection issues concerning alien
land laws, see Fisch, State Regulation of Alien Land Ownership, 43 Mo. L. RIv. 407, 414
(1978); Lowe, The Arizona Alien Land Law: Its Meaning and ConstitutionalValidity, 1976
ARiz. ST. L.J. 252, 262-72; Morrison, supra note 3, at 639-44. The due process implications
of alien land laws are analyzed in Fisch, State Regulation of Alien Land Ownership, 43 Mo.
L. REv. 407, 419-21 (1978), and Morrison, supra note 3, at 644-45. State alien land laws also
are subordinated to the complex treaty obligations of the United States by the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution. See Havenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879).
United States treaty obligations affecting alien property rights are considered in Morrison,
supra note 3, at 656-63.

September 1980]

ALIEN LAND LAWS

259

Traditional State Power Over Land Tenure as
A Limitation on Federal Power
An important consideration in analyzing the constitutional issues relating to legislative power to regulate alien land acquisition
is the role states historically have played in American property jurisprudence. In United States v. Fox,' 1 the Supreme Court, which
consistently has recognized that property law is governed primarily
by state law, stated: "The power of the State to regulate the tenure
of real property within her limits, and the modes of its acquisition
and transfer . .. is undoubted.' 4 2 Accordingly, federal power to
regulate 4 alien investment in real property could be affected by
traditional state power to regulate the ownership of land.
Most decisions regarding the state's power to regulate land
ownership involve challenges to state laws regarding succession to
real or personal property. In these cases, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the power to control succession is deeply rooted in
state sovereignty and properly the subject of state regulation."
Thus, the states have been allowed great latitude to establish individual regulatory schemes and are free to limit, condition, or even
abolish the power of testamentary disposition. 5
A number of challenges to federal legislation operating in
areas of traditional state concern have invoked the tenth amendment,46 arguing that it guarantees the states exclusive power to
41. 94 U.S. 315 (1877).
42. Id. at 320.
43. Congressional power to enact a federal alien land law under the powers granted by
the commerce clause appears certain. The Supreme Court has stated: "The Commerce
Clause reaches, in the main, three categories of problems. First, the use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce which Congress deems are being misused .... Sercond, protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce .... Third, those activities affecting

commerce." Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1970). Foreign investment in United
States properties would seem to fall within the third category.
44. See Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 193 (1938); Mager v. Grima, 49 U.S. 490, 493-94
(1850).
45. See Irving Trust v. Day, 314 U.S. 556 (1941). However, this power is not unlimited.
For example, state succession laws which attempt to abolish rights of aliens to inherit real
property guaranteed by national treaty obligations will be struck down under the supremacy
clause. Havenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879). Indeed, state recognition of this limitation is reflected in recently enacted alien land laws which expressly limit the application of
the statute to rights not secured by treaty. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10.1-.02 (Supp.
1979).
46. The tenth amendment provides that "powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
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regulate those areas considered to be retained by the state as part
of its sovereignty. 47 This construction of the tenth amendment,
however, has not been accepted by the Supreme Court. In dispelling the idea that the tenth amendment imposes any limitation on
the powers of the federal government, the Supreme Court in
United States v. Darby48 set forth the often quoted statement that
the "[a]mendment states but a truism that all is retained which
has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its
adoption to suggest that.., its purpose was other than to allay
fears that the new national government might seek to exercise
powers not guaranteed .

.

... 4" The Court concluded that the

tenth amendment does not deprive the "national government of
authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power
which are appropriate and plainly adopted to the permitted
end." 50
This construction has been followed consistently by the Supreme Court," even where federal legislation conflicts with state
legislation in an area traditionally controlled by the states.52 Although the ability to acquire, transmit, and hold real property traditionally has been controlled by state law, the federal government
nevertheless may legislate on matters that appear to be of purely
local concern if it does so pursuant to constitutionally granted
powers. 53
47. For example, the tenth amendment has been advanced unsuccessfully to justify
limiting congressional determination of attorneys who may practice before the Patent Office
because of the traditional power of the state over the ability to practice law. See Sperry v.
Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 403 (1963).
48.

312 U.S. 100 (1940).

49. Id. at 124.
50. Id.
4,
51. See, e.g., Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 102 (1945); Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S.
340, 362 (1945); United States v. Appalachian Elect. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 428 (1940).

But see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Fair Labor Standards Act
not applicable to employees of states or their political subdivisions).
52.

For example, in United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961), the Supreme Court

rejected a tenth amendment challenge to a federal statute providing that if a veteran died in
a veteran's hospital without a will or legal heirs, his or her property would vest in the federal government rather than passing to the state under state escheat laws. Neither the majority opinion nor the dissenting opinion found that the tenth amendment "diluted" the
powers of the federal government. Rather, the issue which divided the Court was whether
the federal legislation was enacted pursuant to constitutionally granted powers.
53. See note 43 & accompanying text supra.
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Barriers to State Regulation
Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause
The relationship of restrictions on alien rights to own American real property to foreign investment in the United States and to
domestic farming interests indicates that such legislation must be
considered in light of the negative implications of the commerce
clause.5 The threshold question in determining whether state regulation of alien property rights unconstitutionally burdens foreign
commerce is whether restriction of foreign investment in United
States real property affects foreign commerce. 55 Commerce has
been broadly defined to "comprehend every species of commercial
intercourse between the United States
and foreign nations" 56 that
7
extraterritorial.
stage
is at some
54. The commerce clause of the Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Although the Constitution does not expressly restrict state power to
regulate these areas in the absence of congressional action, certain restrictions have been
determined judicially and commonly are referred to as the negative implications of the commerce clause. See L. TRmE, AmucAN CONSTrrUTONAL LAW 320-21 (1978).
55. The constitutionality of state alien land laws under a commerce clause analysis is
not dependent on a finding that foreign investment in United States real property constitutes foreign commerce. Legislation which does not regulate foreign commerce will be struck
down if it has a forbidden effect on foreign commerce. In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1942), the Supreme Court stated that "[the] distinction between local regulation of those
who are not engaged in commerce... and the regulation of those who engage in the commerce ... has in general served ...as a ready means of distinguishing those local activities
which, under the Commerce Clause, are the appropriate subject of state regulation despite
their effect on Interstate Commerce. But courts are not confined to so mechanical a test.
When Congress has not exerted its power under the Commerce Clause, and state regulation
of matters of local concern is so related to interstate commerce that it also operates as a
regulation of that commerce, the reconciliation of the power thus granted with that reserved
to the state is to be attained by the accommodation of the competing demands of the state
and national interests involved." Id. at 362. However, where the state does regulate foreign
commerce directly, a stronger case for unconstitutionality is present.
56. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193-94 (1824).
57. Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. 568, 573 (1852). Although no Supreme Court case has held
that foreign investment in United States real property constitutes foreign commerce, the
Court has indicated in dicta that a real property sales transaction between a citizen and a
corporation of different states does not affect interstate commerce. In Munday v. Wisconsin
Trust, 255 U.S. 499 (1920), a Maine corporation appealed a state court decision denying the
validity of a deed to lands in Wisconsin purchased from a Wisconsin resident. The deeds
were dated and delivered in Illinois. In two brief paragraphs of dicta the Court indicated
that the commerce clause did not restrict the state from setting the terms upon which foreign corporations were able to acquire property within the state because "[n]o interstate
commerce was directly involved in the transactions." Id. at 503. If followed, this dicta would
create an obstacle to finding that alien land investment affects foreign commerce. However,
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Alien acquisitions of real property in the United States are
usually commercial investments; rarely do aliens buy large
amounts of land in this country solely for personal use. Potential

investors are attracted to property within the United States because of the security of the investment. 58 There is little chance of
governmental appropriation of private property, and the possibility of radical changes in governmental policy adversely affecting
foreign investments is minimal. In addition, the recently declining
value of the United States dollar lowers the cost of United States
property to many foreign purchasers. 59 Finally, investment in
United States real estate boasts a relatively high rate of return on

the investment 0 and may provide special tax advantages. 61 These
factors encourage commercial dealings and thus commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign countries.
The commercial nature of a transaction, however, is not sufficient to render it susceptible to characterization as part of foreign
commerce. There also must be some extraterritorial aspect to the

transactions.62 It is doubtful that ownership of land located in the
United States may be considered an extraterritorial activity because investment and not ownership gives rise to the commercial
character of the transaction. The acquisition of such lands, how-

ever, does appear to involve activities that may be characterized as
the lack of express analysis and reasoning appear to make the case distinguishable.
58. Foreign Investment in U.S. Farmland, The Library of Congress, Congressional
Research Service, Major Issues System, Issue Brief No. EB 78064, at 3 (1979).
59. Id.
60. The most dramatic rate of return is on investment in American farmland. For the
period from 1965 to 1977, the farm real estate index more than tripled while the GNP deflator did not double and the Standard and Poors stock average did not change significantly.
Impact on Foreign Investment in Farmland:Hearings on H.R. 13128 before the Subcomm.
on Family Farms of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 45-46 (1978)
(statement of Howard W. Hjort) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Foreign Investment in
Farmland].Between 1972 and 1978, farmland prices on a nationwide level rose from $219
per acre to $490 per acre. This represents an increase of 124%, or 20% per year. Id. at 29
(statement of James Jeffords).
61. The major tax advantage for foreign investors is that nonresident aliens generally
do not have to pay tax in the United States on gains derived from the sale or exchange of
capital assets. However, such aliens are frequently subject to such taxation in their home
country. Id. at 60 (statement of Fred Bergsten). Moreover, Congress is currently considering
amending the tax laws to subject nonresident aliens to capital gains taxes on the sale or
exchange of domestic lands. See S. 208, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), H.R. 5633, 96th Cong.,
1st Seas. (1979). For an exhaustive treatment of the tax aspects of foreign investment in
United States real property, see Zagaris, Investment by Nonresident Aliens in United
States Real Estate, 31 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 565 (1977).
62. See note 57 & accompanying text supra.
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extraterritorial transactions. The most obvious is the international
flow of currency into this country. These transactions often involve
the services of international banking operations to exchange foreign currencies for United States currency and transmit the funds
to local property vendors. United States finance companies actually finance these property sales in some transactions. Furthermore,
United States real estate brokers advertise local lands for sale in
newspapers across Europe and Canada, and engage the services of
foreign real estate brokers, thus indicating that state regulation of
nonresident alien rights to acquire and hold real property does affect foreign commerce.6 The crucial question thus becomes
whether such legislation has an unconstitutional effect on foreign
commerce.
The modern approach for determining the validity of state
regulation affecting interstate and foreign commerce involves a
balancing of the state interest furthered by the legislation and the
national interest embodied in the commerce clause. The standard
for making this determination was set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.:"
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest... it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then
the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden
that will be tolerated will. . . depend on the nature of the local
interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well
with a lesser impact on interstate activities6 5
When the legislation discriminates against interstate or foreign
commerce, the burden shifts to the state to justify the regulation
in terms of the local benefits and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives to preserve that interest adequately."6
The United States Supreme Court consistently has struck
down state legislation creating discriminatory barriers to competi63. The fact that the actual transfer of title in the sale of real property is a purely
local event does not preclude a finding of unconstitutionality. The effect on actual investment as well as on the services related to such investment may be sufficient to render the
state statute invalid. See note 55 supra.
64. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
65. Id. at 142.
66. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353
(1977).
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tion in both interstate 7 and foreign commerce.68 Moreover, recent
decisions by the Court indicate that even state legislation that is
nondiscriminatory on its face nonetheless may be found to discriminate against interstate commerce because of its practical effect.6
Careful examination of state alien land laws indicates that
such legislation purposefully discriminates against foreign commerce by curbing foreign competition in the local marketplace.
The discrimination is most apparent when the effect of such legislation is confined to the real property investment market. Under
normal market conditions, land prices will be set by competitive
interaction between all investors interested in the property. When
a state prohibits the acquisition of real property by nonresident
67.

The leading case on discrimination against interstate commerce is Baldwin v.

G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). In Baldwin, the state had prohibited retail sales
within its borders of milk purchased from out of state dairies at a lower price than local
dairies sold milk. The purpose of the statute was to control the wholesale price of milk sold
within the state. In striking down the legislation as violative of the commerce clause, the

Court rejected the asserted state interests in the economic viability of the local dairy industry and ensuring a regular and adequate supply of milk as insufficient to justify the discriminatory burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 527. Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court,
stated that "[t]o give entrance to that excuse would be to invite a speedy end of our national solidarity. The Constitution ... was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the
several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation
are in union and not division." Id. at 523. This concept of a national economy free from
segregation into local markets led the Court to conclude that a state may not erect barriers
at the state line to protect against the competition from the products or labor force of another state. Id. at 527.
Discrimination against interstate commerce also provided the grounds for striking down
a local ordinance prohibiting the sale of milk not locally pasteurized and bottled. See Dean
Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). Similar reasoning required invalidation of state legislation which reserved a substantial share of the state market to local producers by requiring distributors to purchase milk locally and accept out of state milk only if
local purchasers could not fill distributors' needs. See Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v.
Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964).
68. In Hale v. Bimco Trading Co., 306 U.S. 375 (1939), the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional a Florida statute imposing large inspection fees on cement from foreign countries while similar state products were not subject to such charges. The state argued that the
inspection of foreign cement was necessary for the public safety. The Court rejected this
contention and stated that "discrimination against foreign commerce by the onerous extraction of an inspection fee," admittedly designed to curb foreign competition, was an unconstitutional assumption of national power by the state. Id. at 380-81. The Court also noted
that the very purpose of the statute was to keep out foreign goods. Id. at 380.
69. In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977), the
Court found de facto discrimination because the statute raised marketing costs for interstate commerce producers while leaving local commerce costs unaffected. The statute thus
deprived outside producers of a competitive advantage enjoyed by local producers. Id. at
351. See also Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
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aliens, however, the state has restricted competition from foreign
investors.
Other implications of ownership restrictions on real property
become apparent when the focus is shifted from land as an investment to land as a basic component cost in farming. Arguments advanced by farmers in support of alien land laws illustrate that
state restrictions on alien land tenure exclude competition from
foreign commerce to the benefit of local commercial interests. The
farmer contends that foreign investors are not primarily interested
in purchasing land to compete in the production of agricultural
commodities.7 0 Instead, foreign buyers allegedly purchase United
States farm land for its extremely favorable investment characteristics. The farmer, on the other hand, claims a primary interest in
crop income rather than land speculation. As these two classes of
purchasers compete for a limited supply of agricultural land, foreign buyers, motivated by investment interests where the cost of
land is less related to cash flow return, are willing to pay more
than farmers who must balance production costs and prices received for crops. The purported result is that land prices are
driven up to the point that the local farmer is precluded from
purchasing land.7 1 Higher land values also mean higher property
70. One legislator, the author of a proposed alien land law for California, expressed
the concern of many farmers when he stated "[right now in many farming areas it is impossible to justify a high price for land based on annual returns from farming. Foreigners are
buying up farmland purely for speculation reasons and I'm afraid the California agricultural
economy will suffer because of it." Hearing on ACA 20 before Assembly Finance,Insurance,
and Commerce Comm. (July 18, 1979) (statement of Assemblyperson Richard Lehman).
71. Hearings on Foreign Investment in Farmland,supra note 60, at 101-02 (statement of C. Frazier, Director, Washington Office, National Farmers Organization); id. at 10811 (statement of R. Mullins, Assistant Director of Legislative Services, National Farmers
Union). The soundness of this economic analysis has been questioned. First, increased land
prices have been attributed, at least in part, to increased farming efficiency. As farming
becomes more efficient, each individual farmer is able to work a larger area of land. Thus,
the increased demand of domestic farmers is a major force driving up the price of farmland.
Second, increases in prices resulting from foreign investment will not be maintained. The
rate of return on the investment will drop as land values increase. Investors will then withdraw from the real property market and reinvest in other capital markets yielding higher
rates of return. Finally, assuming foreign investment does inflate farmland prices, restricting
foreign investment only in farmland will not keep land values down. Foreign investment in
the United States generally will have the same effect regardless of the specific capital market in which the investment is made. This is because foreign investment in other capital
markets will increase the value of those assets, thus decreasing the rate of return on the
investment and causing domestic investors to reinvest in other capital markets such as
farmland. Luttrell, The "Danger"From Foreign Ownership of U.S. Farmland,61 FED. REs.
BANK OF ST. Louis Rzv. 27 (1979).
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taxes, another increase in production costs for the farmer. Finally,
inheritance taxes on agricultural land with inflated value may
amount to an insurmountable obstacle to the young family farmers
attempting to enter the market after inheriting agricultural land.
The state is then called on to intervene.7 2 Simply stated, farmers

contend that unrestricted competition for agricultural land between intrastate, interstate, and foreign buyers inhibits the profitable operation of farm land, and thus the state must erect statutory
barriers to competition from foreign investors.
The issue thus arises as to whether the discrimination against
foreign commerce can be distinguished from discriminatory legislation struck down by the Court in the past. The state may attempt
to distinguish the inherent protectionism of alien land laws because they involve protection only against foreign commerce, leaving interstate commerce unrestricted. However, the Supreme Court
has held that state discrimination against exclusively foreign commerce for the purpose of protecting local commerce is repugnant to
the principles of the commerce clause. 73 In fact, the Court expressly stated that it would not be "easy to imagine a statute more
clearly designed to circumvent what the Commerce Clause forbids." 74 An additional distinction may be drawn as alien land laws
do not involve the typical case of state discrimination against competition from foreign products to the advantage of local sellers of
those same products. Rather, such laws restrict competition to the
local farmer from foreign investors and not from foreign farmers.
However, the effect of the state's action is equally repugnant to the
commerce clause in both situations as the state is promoting its
local industry's economic interests by restrictions affecting foreign
commerce.
State legislation that affects foreign commerce is not per se
unconstitutional because it is discriminatory. Instead, a balancing
test is applied both where the statute operates evenhandedly and
where it discriminates, although discriminatory legislation is sub72. This argument has been weakened substantially by the enactment of I.R.C. §
2032A as a part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2003(a), 90 Stat. 1520,
1856-1861 (1976). Section 2032A is designed to encourage continued use of real property for
farming and to eliminate forced sales of farming land as a result of the imposition of the
estate tax. H.R. REP.No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 21-22 (1966).
73. Hale v. Bimco Trading Co., 306 U.S. 75 (1939). See note 68 supra.
74. 306 U.S. at 380.
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ject to stricter judicial scrutiny.7" State interests in enacting restrictions against nonresident alien acquisition and holding of real
property must therefore be considered.
Through its sovereignty, the state generally is regarded as having legitimate interests in providing for the health, safety, and well
being of its populace. 7 Because many have linked absentee ownership by nonresident aliens with inadequate contribution to the
civic and social needs of society,7 7 control of property rights is one
way the state may protect its citizenry. The Supreme Court recognized this connection when it upheld a Washington alien land law
against due process and equal protection attacks, stating: "The
quality and allegiance of those who own, occupy, and use the farm
lands... are matters of highest importance and affect the safety
and power of the State itself. 7'1 One way the state may deem it
necessary to provide for the health of the local community is by
ensuring an adequate supply of food for its citizens.7 9 It may be
argued that alien control of United States farmland will jeopardize
this supply because decisions regarding the use of farmland owned
by aliens will be made purely on the basis of the economic considerations of maximizing personal profit with no account for state
and national interests. The more suspicious might foresee the control of our nation's food supply in the hands of hostile or disloyal
aliens. Even assuming that the alien will act solely according to
profit motives, however, the same is likely to be true of all land
speculators. In addition, the threat that hostile aliens will attempt
to jeopardize the United States food supply through individual
purchases of farmland appears almost nonexistent.
The state also may assert the interest of advancing the economic welfare of local business interests, an interest the Supreme
75. See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
76. This concept apparently devolved from feudal times when the land tenure system
provided security for the health and safety of the people. The Supreme Court also has recognized that state interests in the health and safety of its citizens justify certain land use
regulations. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
77. See Hearings on Foreign Investment in Farmland,supra note 60, at 109-10 (statement of National Farmers Union). But see Luttrell, The "Danger" From Foreign Ownership of U.S. Farmland,61 FED. Rss. BANK OF ST. Louis REv. 4 (1979).
78. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 221 (1923).
79. This is essentially the same state interest rejected as insufficient in Baldwin. See
note 66 supra.
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Court has long recognized as legitimate.8" More specifically, the
state may determine that the plight of the family farmer may be
lessened by restricting foreign investment in farmlands. That such
determinations are the proper subject of legislative and not judicial
decision cannot be doubted. However, at least one authority has
questioned whether such restrictions will appreciably help solve
the problems of the family farmer or if they are merely measures
directed at an easily identifiable target in an effort to alleviate the
frustration of attempting to solve a difficult problem."1
The outcome of balancing the federal interest in foreign commerce being free from the effect of discriminatory state legislation
against the asserted state interests may well be determined by
three underlying factors. First, the Court most likely will be hesitant to strike down legislation enacted under the traditional state
power to define land tenure within its borders.8 2 Second, the role of
the Court in determining the negative implications of the commerce clause is tentatively to allocate power between state and
federal legislatures, subject to later reallocation by Congress when
it exercises its powers under the commerce clause.8 3 Accordingly,
the Court's role is to guard the national interests embodied in the
commerce clause until such time as Congress acts. 4 This role may
be altered in the case of discriminatory state legislation affecting
foreign investment in United States property because Congress'
enactment of the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act
of 1978 s 5 can be seen as indicating legislative awareness of potential threats posed by such investment, making judicial safeguarding unnecessary. On the other hand, this legislation may indicate
that Congress is concerned with whether foreign investment undermines the United States economy, a national interest quite distinct
80.
81.
Charles
82.

See, e.g., Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prod. Co., 306 U.S. 346, 352 (1939).
Hearings on Foreign Investment in Farmland,supra note 60, at 64 (statement of
Meissner).
See notes 76-77 & accompanying text supra.
83. L. TRmE, AlmxicAN CONsTrruTONAL LAW 319 (1978).
84. Congressional consent to state legislation may serve to validate alien land laws
notwithstanding the fact that such laws would be struck down under the commerce clause
as discriminating against foreign commerce. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S.
408 (1946). This is especially relevant because the federal bill, as introduced, contains a
clause providing that the federal alien land laws will not "limit or negate any State law
governing real estate transactions, the acquisition of agricultural land in the State, [or] related matters." S. 194, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1979). See notes 38-39 & accompanying text
supra.
85. See note 37 & accompanying text supra.
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from the interest in foreign commerce being free from the effects
of discriminatory alien land laws. Third, the Court repeatedly has
expressed disapproval of state legislation that discriminates
against interstate or foreign commerce. 8 6
In the above discussion of the negative implications of the
commerce clause it was assumed that the restrictions imposed on
the states are equal whether interstate or foreign commerce is affected. There is authority for the proposition that the negative implications of the congressional foreign commerce and interstate
commerce power are the same.8 7 However, two recent Supreme
86. See notes 67-69 & accompanying text supra.
87. The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted this position in K.S.B. Technical Sales
Corp. v. North Jersey, 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977), in upholding the New Jersey "Buy
American" statute against a commerce clause attack. The issue of discrimination against
foreign commerce was not addressed as the court reasoned that the affects on commerce
which are created when a state enters the market on its own behalf should be distinguished
from state interference with the natural functioning of the international market through
burdensome regulation. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). However, the court frankly stated: "That this case involves foreign commerce and not interstate
commerce does not disturb our analysis." 75 N.J. at 299, 381 A.2d at 788. The court reasoned that the scope of Congress' foreign commerce power was similar to its power over
interstate commerce and that commerce clause cases involving exclusively foreign commerce
had failed to draw any distinction between interstate and foreign commerce in the absence
of interference with the national foreign affairs power.
In State v. Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530 (Alaska 1976), the Alaska Supreme court also indicated that it saw no reason for distinguishing between interstate commerce and foreign commerce for the purpose of determining the negative implications of the commerce clause,
stating: "The Supreme Court has expressly declined to distinguish between state regulations
of interstate commerce and regulation dealing with foreign commerce. In either case the
prohibitory reach of the Commerce Clause is determined by the same analysis ...
" Id. at
539.
The United States Supreme Court decision relied on by the Alaska Court in reaching
that conclusion was Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948). The sole issue
before the Court in Bob-Lo was whether the commerce clause prohibited the application of
a state civil rights act to a company engaged in foreign commerce. The defendant Bob-Lo
operated an amusement park which almost completely occupied a small island in Canadian
waters. Patrons of the park were ferried by Bob-Lo to and from Detroit. The Court readily
conceded that transportation of passengers from the United States to foreign destinations
was foreign commerce, id. at 34, but declined to find that the state regulation unconstitutionally affected such commerce. Id.
Although not expressly stated in Bundrant, the Alaska court apparently based its conclusion on dicta in Bob-Lo in rejecting the inference that states possess no power to regulate
foreign commerce. In Bob-Lo, the Supreme Court noted that it is often forgotten that the
historic decision in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 Haw.) 299 (1851), dealt "indiscriminantly" with interstate and foreign commerce and that states have constitutionally regulated foreign commerce under their local powers in the past. 333 U.S. at 382. Further support for the Alaska court's position is found in the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in
Bob-Lo in which it was contended that the legislation did not offend the commerce clause
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Court decisions involving the states' ability to tax foreign goods
and instrumentalities of foreign commerce indicate that the Court
currently views commerce with foreign nations as a subject to be
regulated by the federal government speaking with one voice. 88 In
light of the conflicting and outdated case law concerning the commerce clause and foreign commerce, these two cases should be accorded great weight even though the burdens on foreign commerce
involved in these cases were imposed by state taxation and not
regulation.
The first of these two cases, Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,58
considered the validity of a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property
tax on imported tires. In holding that the tax did not violate the
import-export clause,9 0 the Court noted thatone major objective of
principles relating to interstate commerce and that nothing in the commerce clause placed
foreign commerce on a more protected level. Id. at 41-42.
Three aspects of Bob-Lo support the conclusion that the Alaska Supreme Court misread the decision. First, a great effort was made to emphasize that the fact situation involved in the case was extremely atypical of foreign commerce. Justice Rutledge observed
that the amusement park was an island in more than a geographical sense. The island and
the business were found to be insulated from "all commercial or social intercourse and traffic with the people of another country usually characteristic of foreign commerce ....
Id.
at 36. If the fact that the commerce was foreign and not interstate was not independently
relevant, there would be no need to emphasize that the foreign commerce in Bob-Lo was
atypical. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 456 n.20 (1979).
Secondly, the Court points out that the regulation involved contained "nothing out of harmony, much less inconsistent with our federal policy in the regulation of commerce between
the two countries; nor ... with Canadian law and policy." 333 U.S. at 37. This observation
indicates the Supreme Court's concern with state legislation which contravenes established
foreign policy-a consideration not involved where the burden is on interstate commerce.
Thirdly, probably the most important reason behind the result reached in Bob-Lo does not
expressly appear in the opinion. That is, the Supreme Court was not prepared to strike
down legislation embodying strong state interests in racial equality in light of the minute
impact on foreign commerce.
88. There is authority in scattered commerce clause cases for the position that regulation of foreign commerce is a function necessarily entrusted solely to the federal government. For example, the Supreme Court has indicated that the imposition of burdensome
"conditions on those engaged in active commerce with foreign nations must of necessity be
national in its character" and require "a uniform system or plan." Henderson v. Mayor of
New York, 92 U.S. 259, 273 (1875). Similarly, in Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill. v.
United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1932), the Supreme Court stated: "It is an essential attribute of
the power [to regulate foreign commerce] that it is exclusive and plenary. As an exclusive
power, its exercise may not be limited, qualified, or impeded to any extent by state action."
Id. at 56-57. See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534, 555-56 (1959);
Bowman v. Chicago & N.R. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 482 (1888); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 228 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring).
89. 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
90. The import-export clause provides: "No State shall, without the Consent of the
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granting the federal government exclusive power to lay imposts
and duties was that "the Federal Government must speak with one
voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments, and tariffs, which might affect foreign relations, could not
be implemented by the States consistently with that exclusive
power." 91
The concept of the federal government speaking with one
voice in the regulation of foreign commerce was extended from the
import-export clause to the commerce clause in Japan Line, Ltd.
v. County of Los Angeles.92 In JapanLine, the Court struck down
a state ad valorem property tax as applied to cargo containers used
exclusively in foreign commerce. Assuming the state tax passed
muster under the established fourfold test for state taxation burdening interstate commerce, 93 the Court expressly rejected the idea
that the commerce clause analysis is identical regardless of
whether interstate commerce or foreign commerce is involved.'
The Court held that in addition to satisfying the fourfold test applicable to interstate commerce, the tax must not create a substantial risk of international multiple taxation nor prevent the federal
government from speaking with one voice in the regulation of commercial relations with foreign nations. 95
The fact that the United States Supreme Court will analyze
the burdens, imposed by state taxation of. foreign commerce and
interstate commerce differently is in itself a strong indication that
the burdens imposed by state regulation on foreign commerce and
interstate commerce also should be distinguished. Moreover, the
Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing its inspection Laws." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
91. 423 U.S. at 285. The Court indicated three reasons the tax under consideration did
not impair this objective: (1) the tax did not fall on imports because of the place of origin;
(2) the tax could not be used to create preferences for domestic goods; and (3) application of
the tax was not inconsistent with federal regulation of foreign imports. Id. at 286.
92. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
93. No impermissible burden on interstate commerce will be found if a state tax "is
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned,
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State." Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).

94. 441 U.S. at 446.
95. Id. at 451. The Court indicated that although the idea that the federal government
should speak with one voice was originally recognized as an objective of the import-export
clause, the policies behind that section of the commerce clause were very similar. Thus,
"[t]he need for federal uniformity is no less paramount in ascertaining the negative implications of Congress' power to 'regulate Commerce with foreign Nations' under the Commerce

Clause." Id. at 449.
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analysis of the Court seems to compel this conclusion. In Japan
Line, the Court reasoned that there are two considerations which
require the more extensive constitutional analysis when the state
seeks to tax the instrumentalities of foreign commerce. One of
these considerations is that a state tax on the instrumentality of
foreign commerce may "impair federal uniformity in an area where
federal uniformity is essential.""e The Court stated that federal
uniformity is imperative for primarily three reasons: (1) foreign
commerce is preeminently a matter of national concern; (2) the
scope of congressional power over foreign commerce is greater than
the power over interstate commerce; and (3) the framers of the
Constitution expressed an overriding concern that the federal government speak with one voice in regulating foreign commerce.7
Wages and Japan Lines thus suggest that state regulation affecting foreign commerce will be subjected to stricter judicial scrutiny
and must not prevent the federal government from speaking with
one voice in the regulation of foreign commerce.9 8
96. Id. at 448.
97. Id. at 448-49.
98. There are indications that the "one voice" doctrine may be limited to those situations where the federal government has set forth a national policy. In Japan Lines, the
Court noted that the state tax contravened the national policy expressed in an international
convention agreement. Id. at 453. State restrictions on alien land holdings may, however,
contravene established federal policy. The general position of the executive branch of the
federal government regarding foreign direct investment in the United States is one of neutrality. The Assistant Secretary for the Treasury for International Affairs has stated that
"[t]he fundamental policy of the U.S. Government toward international investment is to
neither promote nor discourage inward or outward investment flows or activities." Hearings
on Foreign Investment in Farmland,supra note 60, at 55 (statement of C. Bergsten). An
exception to this policy is recognized when those advocating intervention demonstrate the
investment may have major implications which are inconsistent with our national interest.
The exception includes, for example, foreign ownership of national defense, communication,
and transportation industries. ForeignInvestment in U.S. Industry, supra note 20, at 11.
The Assistant Secretary also stated that as of 1978 the administration did not deem it necessary to recognize an exception to the general policy for foreign investment in farmland.
Hearings on Foreign Investment in Farmland,supra note 77, at 55 (statement of C. Bergsten). However, the Supreme Court may not recognize a policy set forth in a statement by a
lower administrative official as being the official national policy but rather require such policy to be more formally established as in the treaty cited in JapanLines. The federal government also seems to have recognized implicitly the power of the state to prohibit the
holding or real property by foreigners in several existing treaty provisions. For example, one
United States treaty with the Netherlands speaks of the "rights in real property permitted
by the applicable laws of the States. . . ." Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation,
March 27, 1956, United States-Netherlands, art. IX, para. 1(b), 8 U.S.T. 2043, 2056, T.LA.S.
No. 3942. See Lehndorif Geneva, Inc. v. Warren, 74 Wis. 2d 369, 377, 246 N.W.2d 815, 819
(1976) (upholding Wisconsin's alien land laws as constitutional).
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The Supreme Court's analysis of whether state action precludes the federal government from speaking with one voice will
not be the same when the burdensome effect is created by state
regulation and when it is created by state taxation. Decisions examining the constitutional validity of state taxes affecting commerce traditionally have not purported to balance state and federal interests as in cases involving state regulation. 99 Accordingly,
in determining the limitations imposed on state regulation of alien
land tenure the one voice doctrine will not be considered an additional test to be satisfied as it was in Japan Lines. Instead, the
federal interest in regulating with a single voice will be considered
together with the federal interest in protecting foreign commerce
from the discriminatory effects of state regulation in balancing
state and federal interests.
Individual state regulation of nonresident alien land tenure
appears to prevent the federal government from speaking with one
voice in the regulation of foreign commerce. When Iowa is permitted to forbid nonresident aliens from acquiring farmland at the
same time California is allowed to grant full property rights to all
aliens, the federal government obviously is not presenting a uniform policy. Thus, when states individually determine the ability
of foreign investors to purchase real property, one aspect of the
control of foreign commerce is shifted from the federal government
to the states.
Negative Implications of the Foreign Affairs Power
State power to enact alien land laws also may be limited by
negative implications of the federal government's foreign affairs
power. 100 While the federal government's power over foreign affairs
99. See L. TRma, AmncA CONsTrruTiONAL LAW 344 (1978). A few recent decisions
involving state taxes affecting interstate commerce suggest, however, that the Court may be
adapting the balancing test common to state regulation cases to cases involving state taxation. See Washington Rev. Dept. v. Stevedoring Ass'n, 435 U.S. 734, 747-48 (1977). Justice
Powell, dissenting in Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978), stated that "[iun the
absence of congressional action, the Commerce Clause constrains us to view the State's interest in retaining this particular levy against the constitutional preference for an open
economy." Id. at 289 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
100. Although foreign relations may be defined literally as the aggregate of the interactions between the peoples of two countries, the foreign affairs power of the federal government has been interpreted as the power to act as the national representative in relations
with other governments, see note 104 infra, thus limiting the concept of foreign relations to
the interaction between abstract national entities. A foreign relations analysis does not focus
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is not founded on a single provision of the Constitution, there are
grants of power that commonly are regarded as vesting control
10 1 and legislative 0 2
over foreign relations in both the executive
branches of the federal government. The extent of this foreign relations power, however, is not limited by constitutionally enumerated powers.103 Additional extraconstitutional powers are recognized by the Supreme Court as inherent in the nature of a
sovereign nation. 0 4
on whether state action affects some aspect of its populace's interaction with the citizens of
a foreign country, such as the ability to acquire and hold real property in another country.
This approach necessarily would include a seemingly endless variety of state actions in the
class of activities affecting foreign relations. Rather, state legislation is considered an impermissible infringement if it affects the ability of the federal government to deal with other
nations.
101. The President is granted the power to make treaties if two-thirds of the Senate
approve, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 20, to appoint ambassadors, id., and to receive ambassadors. Id. § 3.
102. Congress has exclusive power to lay duties and imposts, id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 1, to
regulate foreign commerce, id. § 8, cl. 3, to establish uniform rules of naturalization, id. § 8,
cl. 4, to regulate the value of foreign coin, id. § 8, cl. 5, and to declare war and grant letters
of Marque and Reprisal, id. § 8, cl. 11.
103.

L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrruTIONAL LAw 158-63 (1978).

104. The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he investment of the federal government
with the powers of external sovereignty [does] not depend upon the affirmative grants of the
Constitution[;]" rather "[a]s a member of the family of nations, the right and power of the
United States in that field are equal to the right and power of the other members of the
international family." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318
(1936). See also Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 396 (1933); MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S.
299, 311 (1915).
Traditionally, control over the relations with foreign nations has been viewed as within
the exclusive dominion of the President, especially in regard to negotiations with foreign
governments. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769-70 & n.4 (1950); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 208 (1948); L. HENKN, FOREIGN AFFAIBS AND THE CoNSTUTIoN 37 (1972)

[hereinafter cited as HENKIN]. In Curtiss-Wright, the Court indicated that "the President
alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation," and that Congress
is powerless to invade this field of foreign relations. 299 U.S. at 319. This conclusion was
predicated on the assumption that the President is the one best informed on international
affairs and best able to act with the discretion necessary to avoid embarrassment to the
country. Id. at 320.
The inherent power of a sovereign nation also was held to be the source of congressional
power over foreign affairs in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), overruled on other
grounds, Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). The continued validity of Perez with respect
to congressional power over foreign affairs does not seem to be disputed. HENKiN, supra
note 104, at 326 n.39. See generally id. at 74-79; Henkin, The Treaty Makers and The Law
Makers: The Law of The Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 903 (1959). In
Perez, the Court reasoned that in addition to maintaining diplomatic relations with foreign
nations, the federal government "must also be able to reduce to a minimum the frictions
that'are unavoidable in a world of sovereigns sensitive in matters touching their dignity and
interests." 356 U.S. at 57.
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There are both constitutional and judicial restrictions imposed
upon state relations with foreign governments. The Constitution
expressly prohibits any state from entering into an agreement or
compact with a foreign power.10 5 State legislation enacting an alien

land law is a unilateral act that may in fact go unnoticed by many
of the countries affected, and thus such legislation cannot be considered either negotiation or entry into a compact with foreign
countries. Recognition by the Supreme Court of foreign affairs as
an exclusive national concern,10 however, established limitations
on the exercise of state power in addition to the specific prohibition against compacts.
In Zschernig v. Miller07 the Supreme Court held that the application of state legislation may involve the state in foreign affairs
and international relations in a manner forbidden by the Constitution.108 The Zschernig Court considered the application of an Ore105. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
106. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941). In United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203 (1942), the Court noted that if the states were allowed power over foreign affairs,
the "equilibrium in our foreign relations which the political departments of our national
government [have] diligently endeavored to establish" might be disturbed as the "nation as
a whole would be held to answer if a State created difficulties with a foreign power." Id. at
232-33. The role of the states in the conduct of foreign affairs was stated succinctly by
Justice Sutherland in United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937): "In respect of all international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state
lines disappear. As to such purposes the [states do] not exist." Id. at 331. See also The
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
107. 389 U.S. 429 (1968). Prior to Zschernig, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of state intrusion into foreign affairs in two cases. In Clark v. Allen, 331
U.S. 503 (1947), the Court considered a California probate code section that conditioned the
right of a nonresident alien to take real property by succession or testamentary disposition
on the existence of a reciprocal right on the part of United States citizens to take property
in the alien's country on the same terms and conditions. The Court's opinion contained only
a brief discussion of the effect of the legislation on foreign affairs. The nonresident alien
argued that California was seeking independently to promote the rights of American citizens
and thus impermissibly entering the field of foreign relations. The Court summarily rejected
this argument as "farfetched." Id. at 517. The implicit reasoning of the Court was that it
had indicated previously that a state does not enter into the field of foreign relations when
it grants aliens an unqualified right to inherit property, see Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S.
333, 340 (1901), and consequently the state did not do so when it limited those same rights.
The Court concluded that "[w]hat California has done will have some incidental or indirect
effect in foreign countries. But that is true of many state laws which none would claim
across the forbidden line." 331 U.S. at 517.
108. One commentator has questioned whether the negative implications of the foreign affairs power are actually constitutional restraints on state power. HFNKN, supra note
104, at 475 n.51. The source of the power is largely extraconstitutional; however, the negative implications of the commerce clause also are, in a sense, extraconstitutional limitations
because the commerce clause is an enumeration of federal power and not an express limita-
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gon probate code section 19 which provided for escheat when a
nonresident alien claimed real or personal property unless the
alien was able to establish three requirements: (1) the existence of
a reciprocal right of a United States citizen to take property on the
same terms as a citizen or inhabitant of the foreign country; (2) the
right of United States citizens to receive payment in the United
States of funds from estates in the foreign country; and (3) the
right of the foreign heirs to receive the proceeds of the estate without confiscation by the foreign government. 110
The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because
the application of all three criteria necessarily involved the state in
foreign affairs and international relations."1 The Court noted that
the Oregon probate courts consistently had engaged in
judicial inquiries into the type of governments that obtain in particular foreign nations ... whether the so-called "rights" are

merely dispensations turning upon the whim or caprice of government officials, whether the representations of consuls, ambassadors, and other representatives of foreign nations is credible or
made in good faith, whether there is in the actual administration
in the particular
foreign system of law any element of
112
confiscation.
These judicial determinations resulted in a "great potential for disruption or embarrassment" of the federal government in administrating foreign policy," 3 leading the Court to conclude that "the
type of probate law that Oregon enforces affects international relation of state power. Professor Henkin also contends that Zschernig announced a new doctrine of constitutional law. Id. at 238-39.
109. OR. REv. STAT. § 111.070 (1957).
110. Id.
111. 389 U.S. at 440-41. The Oregon provision was ruled invalid without overruling
Clark. Instead, Clark was distinguished on the grounds that it concerned "the words of a
statute on its face, not the manner of its application." Id. at 433. Moreover, the Court
pointed out that in Clark it was assumed that the application of the statute involved only a
"routine reading" of foreign laws. Id. Clark thus was limited to the principle that general
reciprocity clauses do not on their face intrude upon the foreign affairs power of the federal
government. Id. at 432. The Court expressly declined to extend the ruling in Clark to uphold the Oregon statute as applied, and there was no indication in the Zschernig opinion
that any of the three provisions of the Oregon statute were invalid on their face. In fact, two
concurring Justices advocated that all three statutory requirements should be held invalid
on their face and to that extent, Clark should be overruled. Id. at 442-44 (Stewart, J., concurring). The concurring Justices reasoned that any realistic application of the criteria necessarily would involve a prohibited evaluation of foreign governments. Id.
112. Id. at 434.
113. Id. at 435.
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tions in a persistent and subtle way" 14 and imposes a "direct impact upon foreign relations."'1 5
The Zschernig opinion indicates several factors that the Court
may consider in determining whether state regulation is unconstitutional under a foreign affairs analysis. There is language showing
the Court's concern with the effect of the judicial inquiries of the
Oregon courts into the effectiveness of the national government's
foreign policy." 6 More specifically, disapproval was expressed with
the state establishing its own independent foreign policy through
its judiciary's sensitive inquiries into the actual functioning of foreign governments. 117 The probate court opinions demonstrated
state approval or disapproval of foreign governments,"" an action
that is necessarily a part of a foreign affairs policy. The Zschernig
114. Id. at 440.
115. Id. at 441.
116. After acknowledging that descent and distribution of estates is traditionally a
subject for state control, the Court stated that such "regulations must give way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy." Id. at 440. The Court also recognized that the application of the Oregon statute "may well adversely affect the power of the
central government to deal with [the] problems [of foreign relations]." Id. at 441.
117. See text accompanying note 112 supra. The final remark in the opinion is that
"[t]he Oregon law does, indeed, illustrate the dangers which are involved if each State,
speaking through its probate courts, is permitted to establish its own foreign policy." 389
U.S. at 443. In addition, the characterization of the state court's application of the statute
demonstrates that the Court considered the state to be exercising independent judgment on
the policies of foreign governments. For example, the Court concluded that Oregon decisions
applying the statute indicate that "foreign policy attitudes, the freezing or thawing of the
'cold war,' and the like [were] the real desiderata." Id. at 437. The Oregon court decisions
also were read to involve a search for a "'democracy quotient' of a foreign regime as opposed to the Marxist theory." Id. at 435. The practical effect was that "[t]he statute as
construed . . . [made] unavoidable judicial criticism of nations established on a more authoritarian basis than our own." Id. at 440.
The notion of states enacting individual foreign policies also appeared in Clark. Even
though the argument was dismissed summarily, the Court paraphrased the nonresident
alien's claim to be that California was seeking independently to promote foreign policy. See
note 107 supra. The fact that the Court ruled the state had not gone too far in its actions
does not seem to detract from the Court's consideration of whether the state was independently pursuing a foreign policy. It was not until the judicial action in Zschernig, however,
that the Court was willing to find the state had crossed the "forbidden line" in establishing
its independent foreign policy.
118. In footnote 8, the Zschernig Court extensively quotes from state court decisions
to illustrate such judicial impropriety. 389 U.S. at 437 n.8. For example, one judge stated,
"If you want to say I'm prejudiced, you can, because when it comes to Communism I'm a
bigoted anti-Communist." Id. Another court took judicial notice that "Russia kicks the
United States in the teeth all'the time." Id. Yet another judge commented that the Soviets
"hastily and covertly deported about 60,000 of its people to Russia and Siberia, and in addition, exterminated many of its elderly residents." Id. at 439 n.9.
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opinion also may imply that the country as a whole may be embarrassed and foreign relations disrupted because of the impact in foreign countries created by state action." 9
State imposed limitations on nonresident aliens' rights to inherit property is only one of many areas in which state action
might have,an impermissible impact on foreign affairs. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue
of state involvement in the conduct of foreign affairs since
Zschernig, and the implications of Zschernig have been considered
in only a very few cases outside the area of state probate law. 120 In
119. "Experience has shown that international controversies of the gravest moment,
sometimes even leading to war, may arise from real or imagined wrongs to another's subjects
inflicted, or permitted, by a government." 389 U.S. at 441 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 64 (1941)). The Court also observes that a state cannot be precluded completely
from applying the laws of foreign nations despite the fact "there is a remote possibility that
any holding may disturb a foreign nation." 389 U.S. at 433. This latter statement seems to
iiidicate the Court will consider the magnitude of the impact in foreign countries. There
were at least two potential impacts of the state action in Zschernig. The most obvious was
the foreign reaction to state criticism of its internal functioning. There was also a considerable impact created by wrongful deprivation of inheritance. Although criticism of a foreign
government may have a more direct impact on that government, economic realities should
not be ignored. There is great potential for a large impact on foreign countries should many
foreign nationals be deprived of sizeable inheritances by one of the states.
The Clark decision, see note 107 supra, also lends support to the conclusion that the.
Court will consider the impact in foreign countries in determining whether a state action
impermissibly affects foreign relations. This is seen in the wording of the Court's conclusion
that the state action resulted in only "incidental or indirect effects in foreign countries." 331
U.S. at 517 (emphasis added).
120. In the immediate wake of Zschernig,several federal district and state courts were
called on to determine the validity of state probate code provisions similar to the Oregon
statute invalidated in Zschernig. In general, these courts interpreted Zschernig strictly and
confined any inquiry to whether application of the statute involved more than a routine
reading of foreign laws. See, e.g., Shames v. Nebraska, 323 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Neb. 1971);
Bjarsch v. DiFalco, 314 F. Supp. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Goldstein v. Cox, 299 F. Supp. 1389
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Gorum v. Fall, 287 F. Supp. 725 (D.Mont. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 393
U.S. 398 (1969); In re Estate of Horman, 5 Cal. 3d 62, 485 P.2d 785, 95 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1971); In re DeSaultels, 307 N.E.2d 576, 581 n.9 (Mass. Ct. App. 1974); In re Johnson, 16
N.C. App. 38, 190 S.E.2d 879 (1972); In re Estate of Kish, 52 N.J. 454, 246 A.2d 1 (1968).
None of these cases considered any of the other possible impacts of the state action in
foreign countries. The interpretation of Zschernig by the New York Court of Appeals in In
re Estate of Leikind, 22 N.Y.2d 346, 239 N.E.2d 550, 292 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1968), appeal dismissed for want of finality, 397 U.S. 148 (1970), is illustrative of the approach adopted by
the majority of courts testing the validity of these state probate code provisions. The
Leikind court upheld as constitutional a New York statute which conditioned the right of
nonresident aliens to inherit property upon a showing that the proposed recipient would
have the benefits, use, or control of the property. The court considered the state free to
limit the inheritance rights as long as the "courts of [the] State, in applying the 'benefit,
use, or control' requirements, simply determine, without animadversions, whether or not a
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fact, the recent Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion in Lehndorf Geneva, Inc. v. Warren,12 1 which upheld that state's alien land law,
failed to discuss Zschernig at all. This omission may indicate that
lower courts are willing to consider Zschernig only when state action critically evaluates the policies of a foreign nation and do not
deem impact on financial interests of foreign citizens sufficient to
warrant sanction.
Other than state probate code provisions, the only case in
which state legislation was struck down under a Zschernig analysis
is Bethlehem Steel v. Board of Commissioners.22 Bethlehem is a
California appellate court decision invalidating a "Buy American"
statute that required public works contracts to be awarded only to
person's agreeing to use substantially all American made materials. '2 The appellate court reasoned that the statute operated to
place an embargo on foreign goods and thus impermissibly intruded on the federal government's power to conduct a foreign
trade policy, which is the basis of the country's foreign relations. 24
In addition, the court noted that the statute implemented "a type
of protectionism which invites retaliative restrictions on our own
trade."1 2 The court's reasoning is noteworthy because it appears
to be the only time a court has considered exclusively economic
implications of a state's action as involving it in foreign affairs.
The fact that California excluded all foreign goods divorced the
state action from any political statement.""
This analysis thus far has been limited to the effect of state
action on the conduct of foreign relations. However, in enacting an
foreign country, by statute or otherwise, prevents its residents from actually sharing in the
estates of New York decedents. Id. at 352, 239 N.E.2d at 553, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 685.
Three states, California in Estate of Kraemer, 276 Cal. App. 2d 716, 81 Cal. Rptr. 287
(1969); Ohio in Mora v. Battin, 303 F. Supp. 660 (N.D. Ohio 1969); and Pennsylvania in In
re Demeczuk, 444 Pa. 212, 282 A.2d 700 (1971), have ruled that Zschernig compelled invalidation of their probate code sections similar to the Oregon statute in Zschernig. However,
these state courts read Zschernig in essentially the same way as Leikind. Invalidation was
compelled, these courts reasoned, merely because the statutes were substantially identical to

the provision invalidated in Zschernig.
121.
122.

74 Wis. 369, 246 N.W.2d 815 (1976).
276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969). Zschernig was asserted unsuccess-

fully in an attempt to strike down state legislation in K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North
Jersey, 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977), and State v. Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530, 541-42
(Alaska 1976).
123. 276 Cal. App. 2d at 223-24, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 801-02.
124. Id. at 226, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 803.

125. Id. at 228, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
126.

See text accompanying notes 129-30 infra.
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alien land law the state probably is not acting with the intent to
affect foreign countries but rather to promote a valid local interest.127 Considering that the state usually is advancing a legitimate
interest, the restrictive implications of the federal government's
foreign relations power are similar to the negative implications of
the commerce clause. This similarity has led one commentator to
suggest that the Supreme Court's analysis involves a balancing of
federal and state interests: "[C]ertain impingements on foreign affairs are excluded because national uniformity is required; infringements are barred if they discriminate against or unduly burden our foreign relations; the Courts will balance the States
interest in regulation against the impact on American foreign
28

relations.

1

The lack of development in the law concerning the restrictive
implications of the federal power over foreign affairs increases the
difficulty of evaluating the constitutional barriers such power imposes upon the enactment of state alien land laws. The statutes
most vulnerable to attack are those which discriminate among citizens of different foreign countries by allowing only those citizens of
select countries to hold or acquire land. 129 Implicit in such action is
a statement of favoritism that closely parallels the state criticism
of foreign countries in Zschernig.130 Although it may seem incongruous that greater restrictions would be imposed on states denying property rights to select nonresident aliens than states with
blanket prohibitions, when a state creates distinctions between foreign countries it necessarily is engaging in an individual determination of the countries with which it wishes to carry on economic
relations. When a state formulates its own foreign policy, the stability and consistency of the national foreign policy will be disrupted. The primary reason that foreign affairs power is vested exclusively in the national government is because countries interact
127. For example, in Zschernig the state was exercising its power over succession to
property. See notes 109-10 & accompanying text supra.
128. HENKIN, supra note 104, at 241. The Alaska Supreme Court expressly adopted
this balancing test in State v. Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530, 542 (Alaska 1976). This balancing of
interests may underlie the permissibility of the Clark effect on foreign affairs and the forbidden effect of the Zschernig application. In both, there was a strong state interest in controlling succession. However, in Zschernig, not only were foreign nationals deprived of their
inheritances, but foreign governments were subjected to judicial criticism.
129. See alien land laws currently in force in Connecticut, note 30 supra, Mississippi,
note 30 supra, and North Dakota, note 34 supra.
130. See notes 124-26 & accompanying text supra.
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as nations and not as nation to state. The great potential for inconsistency when the parts of a nations speak separately is not present
when the federal government speaks with one voice. Furthermore,
established national policy may not be relied on confidently by foreign countries if it is subject to continuous alteration by individual
state determinations that local interests will be furthered by different and independent foreign policies. In fact, the federal government itself may not know what foreign policy is being established
by inconsistent policies emanating from the individual states. Such
state action will disrupt the relations between sovereign nations,
and in effect require foreign nations to establish relations directly
with the states in their individual capacities. The potential disruption is more clearly recognizable when it is considered that a large
portion of the federal foreign policy is based on the commercial
relations between nations. 3 s Investment by foreign interests is
part of this foreign trade policy. Consequently, state restrictions on
foreign investment in domestic real property may well disrupt effective control of foreign trade by the federal government.
State alien land laws that deny property rights to all nonresident aliens are virtually divorced from any statement of political
approval or disapproval. Insofar as such laws represent an individual state's foreign trade policy, however, they appear inconsistent
with the underlying principles of Zschernig.13 2 Moreover, nondiscriminatory allen land laws present a potential for disruption because of their impact in foreign nations."3 3 A basic premise of the
states' argument is that foreign investment within their borders is
extensive. Assuming this to be true, it must follow that state action
curtailing foreign investment necessarily will be received unfavorably by many or at least powerful foreign interests. The least detrimental effect of the state action depriving nonresident aliens of
these extremely desirable investment opportunities is that nonresident alien investors quietly will invest elsewhere. However, it is
quite possible that the states may prompt foreign countries to respond with retaliatory measures in the formation of laws and policies against the United States.
131.
132.
133.

See notes 117-18 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 117-18, 124-26 & accompanying text supra.
See note 119 & accompanying text supra.
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Conclusion
Federal power to enact a national alien land law is grounded
on the broad powers granted to Congress under the commerce
clause. The traditional state power over real property does not
limit congressional exercise of its constitutionally granted power.
Significant constitutional barriers, however, limit the power of the
states to restrict alien land tenure. When a state seeks to legislate
alien land tenure, a conflict between state power to protect the
health and safety of its citizens and the federal power to regulate
foreign commerce and control foreign affairs emerges and a balance
must be struck.
The state has a strong interest in the control of the lands
within its borders. In addition, the state has an interest in its local
farming economy, and in ensuring an adequate food supply for its
citizens. Finally, the state may be legitimately concerned with the
effect of absentee foreign ownership of land on the political and
social environment of its communities.
The federal interest in protecting interstate and foreign commerce from discriminatory state legislation is firmly embedded in
the commerce clause; an interest that is possibly stronger in the
case of foreign commerce. Recently enacted alien land laws primarily restrict foreign investment in agricultural land, thus indicating
these laws are intended to protect the-local farmer against inflationary land costs. The Supreme Court, however, has consistently
struck down state regulations advancing local commercial interests
at the expense of interstate or foreign commerce.
There is a substantial overlap of the federal powers over foreign commerce and foreign affairs, because the relations between
countries are largely based on commercial interactions. Consequently, the federal interest in delineating alien land rights is
strengthened by the national power over foreign affairs. Alien land
laws that discriminate between alien investments on the basis of
nationality signal political favoritism and thus generate potential
disruptions in the regulation of foreign affairs. The federal interest
also may be threatened where state legislation applies evenhandedly to all foreign investors because independent state foreign
trade policies relating to foreign investment will prevent a uniform
national foreign affairs policy. Moreover, any retaliatory effects of
state alien land laws will be directed at the nation as a whole.
Recent congressional action in the area of foreign investment
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in agricultural land also impacts upon the constitutionality of state
alien land laws. The Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure
Act of 1978 shows congressional awareness of potential infringement on federal interests that may be created by state alien land
laws and thus raises serious questions regarding the necessity of
judicial intervention to protect such interests, a policy consideration underlying the doctrine of the negative implications of the
commerce clause.
Aside from constitutional considerations, Congress is best able
to devise an effective solution to any problems presented by foreign investment in American land. The power over foreign relations has always been vested in the federal government. As a result, the federal government has developed the resources for
gathering information on foreign affairs from which the implications of legislation, both in the United States and abroad, can best
be predicted. Furthermore, the federal government has extensive
experience in the sensitive realm of foreign relations. In contrast,
states have only limited access to information concerning international matters and thus are relatively uninformed about the probable effects of their actions in foreign countries. This knowledge of
the international ramifications of legislation is necessary if informed decisions are to be made. Congress' experience in national
defense makes it able to evaluate any risks to national security created by alien investment, another factor to be considered. Although the states have a legitimate interest in assuring the viability of the local farmer, the federal government has been responsive
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to the problems of the agricultural sector.
Enactment of federal legislation most likely will involve more
delays than passing state legislation, and a comprehensive federal
alien land law necessarily will sacrifice the tailoring to local interests that is possible when laws are written on a state level. These
negative aspects, however, are outweighed by the need for well informed decisions for which the country as a whole will be held responsible. It is therefore urged that the power to enact alien land
laws be vested exclusively in the federal government.

134. See Hearings on Foreign Investment in Farmland,supra, note 60, at 102-03
(statement of C. Frazier, Director, Washington Office, National Farms Organization).

